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Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan: Between Nationalism and Nation-State 
In December of 2011, shortly after becoming the President of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Almazbek Atambayev told a crowd of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks “only together are 
we Kyrgyzstan,” adding “those who try to divide us according to nationality and region 
are enemies of the nation.”1 At other times, Atambayev has claimed that nationalism is 
the “main problem” in Kyrgyzstan.2  
It is not difficult to see why this should be the case. In 1990, even before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks had erupted in the 
city of Osh, in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan. These tragic events repeated themselves 
in June of 2010, when riots once again broke out in Osh, leading to the deaths of 
hundreds of people. In the northern part of the country, ethnic Uyghurs and Dungans 
(Chinese Muslims) have also faced violence at the hands of Kyrgyz nationalists.3 
Relations between Kyrgyz and ethnic Russians have been much less hostile, but the 
frailty of the Kyrgyz economy has meant that many Russians have left the country.4  
Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic diversity presents a serious problem that the country’s 
leadership has yet to resolve. At independence, ethnic Kyrgyz made up barely 52% of the 
population of their own country. Attempts to forge some kind of national identity from 
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the country’s disparate and mistrustful national groups have thus far yielded limited 
results. Although the promotion of Kyrgyz chauvinism seems destined to provoke 
bloodshed, successive governments have been reluctant to seriously pursue the 
construction of a civic "Kyrgyzstani" identity. The Kyrgyz Republic is thus in the 
unenviable position of being trapped between its contemporary existence as a nation-state 
and the threat of violent nationalism. How President Atambayev and his successors will 
navigate these shoals remains unclear. 
The Kyrgyz, like other groups in Central Asia, never conceived of themselves as 
“nations” in the modern sense. Instead, place of birth, tribal and political affiliations, and 
the division between nomadic and settled lifeways were the important markers of 
identity. It was only during the period of korenizatsiia, in the 1920s and 1930s, that 
Soviet ethnographers began to construct the different peoples of Central Asia into 
“nations,” each with their own distinctive language, history, and traditions. Importantly, 
Soviet nationalities policy also mandated that each nation, if it met certain criteria, be 
given its own territory. By creating putative “nation-states” for the different ethnic groups 
that resided in Central Asia (though not by any means for all of them), the Soviet 
government fostered the development of nationalist sentiment. 
The territorial units created by the Soviet government exist today as independent 
states. However, whether by design, accident, or simply the practical impossibility of 
drawing borders that precisely correspond to the actual distribution of different ethnic 
groups, significant minority populations exist within enclaves outside of their titular 
republics. Wixman argues that there was, in fact, a deliberate attempt on the part of the 
Soviet state to divide the Soviet Union’s Muslims into antagonistic groups and to 
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encourage among them national particularism, all in an effort to defuse the 
counterrevolutionary potential of pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism and to make Muslim 
populations easier to rule.5 
Not surprisingly, ethnic particularisms and national antagonisms survived the 
Soviet collapse. So too did the borders drawn by Soviet ethnographers. However, what 
had previously been essentially administrative boundaries between constituent republics 
of the Soviet Union were now international borders between independent states pursuing 
oftentimes-competing interests. This meant that the large minority populations that lived 
in these new states suddenly became “beached diasporas,” to use a term coined by David 
Laitin to describe ethnic Russians in the former Soviet republics.6 Moreover, these 
diaspora populations found themselves in states that were either furiously trying to 
reassert a pre-existing sense of national identity that had been suppressed during the 
Soviet period, as in Georgia or the Baltic states, or desperately trying to formulate one. 
Kyrgyzstan represents the latter case. Having had no previous existence as either 
a nation or a state, in 1992 Kyrgyzstan nevertheless became a nation-state. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, of course, the creation of the “state” part of this equation 
was essentially a fait accompli; more difficult, however, would be elaborating the content 
of Kyrgyz national identity. As Eugene Huskey has noted, Kyrgyzstan was essentially 
forced to build a national identity "from scratch.”7 Even more than the other newly 
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independent states of Central Asia, he argues, Kyrgyzstan suffered from a "dearth of 
usable national history from which to build an identity.”8  
Early attempts at elaborating a Kyrgyz national history focused on the territory of 
Kyrgyzstan itself, as well as the legendary Turkic hero Manas. In his book, entitled 
Kyrgyz Statehood and the National Epos "Manas," Askar Akayev, the first President of 
Kyrgyzstan explicitly attempted to root the existence of the new republic in ancient 
history. He wrote that "[o]nly the combination of the idea of statehood carried by Kyrgyz 
throughout the centuries and the lasting value of the land on which this idea could find 
real embodiment has allowed us to create the independent state in which we live.”9  
Moreover, Akayev claimed that Kyrgyz "statehood" was in part a product of the Kyrgyz 
"national consciousness," which is itself embodied in the epic tale of Manas.10 The 
celebration of Manas was, in retrospect, probably an attempt to find a Kyrgyz analog for 
Genghis Khan, who is claimed by the Kazakhs, or Tamerlane, who has been promoted as 
an Uzbek national hero. 
The problem with formulating a Kyrgyz national ideology around Manas was, 
therefore, that it was necessarily exclusive and Kyrgyz-oriented. Akayev argued that the 
Manas epos, which the government spent millions of dollars celebrating in the 1995 
"Manas 1000 International Festival" was the "historical chronicle, spiritual foundation, 
and cultural reality" of the Kyrgyz people.11 Likewise, the emblems on the flag of the 
Kyrgyz Republic are a sun with forty rays symbolizing the forty Kyrgyz tribes and a 
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stylized representation of a tyndyk, the hole in the top of a Kyrgyz yurt. These 
glorifications of the Kyrgyz's nomadic past did little to persuade the restive Uzbek 
population in the south of the country, where settled agriculture has long been prevalent, 
that their interests were being taken seriously in Bishkek.  
This perception was likely correct. In Kyrgyz Statehood, President Akayev 
casually refers to the entire population of southern Kyrgyzstan as "Southern Kyrgyz" who 
are, moreover, "devoted to their nation.”12 Such rhetoric discursively transforms ethnic 
Uzbeks into Kyrgyz, and implicitly denies their political legitimacy as a group with 
interests different from those of Kyrgyz. As Morgan Liu notes, "[t]he basic premise of 
[Kyrgyz] national ideology locates ethnic minorities as structurally secondary to the core 
purpose of the republic," which is "the fulfillment of the Kyrgyz people's historical 
destiny in self-rule and collective material/cultural development according to a proud 
Kyrgyz heritage.”13 Thus, notwithstanding his slogan that “Kyrgyzstan is our common 
home,”14 Akayev’s efforts to foster a sort of civic “Kyrgyzstani” nationality were 
doomed to failure. Despite his inclusive rhetoric, Akayev was unable to move beyond a 
conception of Kyrgyzstani identity that was primarily built around ethnic Kyrgyz.  
In the end, although Akayev’s idiosyncratic ideas won him some measure of 
support among Uzbeks, they were not enough to provide a secure foundation for the 
incipient Kyrgyzstani national identity. After Akayev’s ouster in the Tulip Revolution, 
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the new government of Kyrgyzstan rapidly assumed a rather less conciliatory attitude 
toward minorities. 
During the Bakiyev period, the position of the Uzbeks was eroded even further. 
Bakiyev himself had built up his power base among ethnic Kyrgyz in the south during his 
tenure as an official in Jalal Abad, and his popularity allowed him to largely ignore the 
interests of Uzbeks. A worsening economic situation, rampant corruption, and clan-based 
nepotism led to a perception of ethnic favoritism and discrimination. These factors, along 
with concerns on the part of ethnic Kyrgyz that Uzbeks were monopolizing the best 
agricultural land in the fertile Ferghana Valley, meant that tensions between these groups 
continued to escalate.15 The problem was further exacerbated by Bakiyev’s use of the 
security services, which were run by his brother, Janysh Bakiyev, to clamp down on 
minority unrest.16  
Tensions boiled over in June of 2010 when, in the wake of Bakiyev’s ouster, 
ethnic riots broke out once again in Osh. Although an uneasy peace was eventually 
restored, the new government has faced intransigence from Kyrgyz nationalists in the 
south, who advocate a tougher line toward Uzbeks.17 Unsurprisingly, the governments of 
interim president Roza Otunbayeva, and that of her successor, Almazbek Atambayev, 
have blasted Kyrgyz nationalism as both “criminal” and an existential threat to the 
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Kyrgyz state.18 This stance, however, leaves post-Bakiyev Kyrgyzstan in much the same 
place as it was before the Bakiyev interlude: in rejecting Kyrgyz chauvinism, it still needs 
to find a way of formulating a historically rooted “Kyrgyzstani” identity that can appeal 
to all of the country’s minority populations.  
Although such an identity has yet to be fully articulated, there are some 
indications that religion may be viewed as a component. Fully 80% of the Kyrgyz 
population identifies as Muslim, with most of the rest professing the Russian Orthodox 
faith. President Atambayev has been careful to reassure Orthodox Christians that their 
rights will be respected. In one interview, he reaffirmed that Orthodoxy was one of the 
“traditional religions of Kyrgyzstan” and that that he believes that “the development of 
Orthodox Christianity in Kyrgyzstan would help… stop the exodus of the Russian-
speaking population and will… facilitate the strengthening of Kyrgyzstan both politically 
and economically.”19  
Furthermore, while commemorating the opening of a new mosque at Solomon’s 
Throne in Osh, one of the most holy sites in Central Asia, Atambayev argued that “[t]he 
Muslims of Osh should become a uniting force for all city dwellers,” regardless of their 
ethnicity.20 “[E]very citizen of Kyrgyzstan,” he said, “should remember that they are part 
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of ‘a single nation.’”21 The new mosque, moreover, was opened on the anniversary of the 
2010 violence, symbolically positioning Islam as a uniting and healing force in society, 
as opposed to the ethnic violence that had previously wracked the city. Meanwhile, the 
government has been increasingly regulating Islam, and there have been debates about 
whether or not imams should become employees of the state.22 Such developments signal 
that the state may see a well-regulated, institutionalized form of Islam as being a force 
that could potentially unify Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. This view is echoed on the ground by 
imams in Osh, who claim that “Islam is the thing that keeps the peace between people.”23  
Even so, there are numerous potential pitfalls that the government must avoid if it 
decides to try to use religion to undergird Kyrgyz national identity. The first is that 
Kyrgyzstan itself is an officially secular state. There is no small amount of resistance in 
Kyrgyz society to the idea of giving Islam – or religion in general – a more prominent 
role in the affairs of the state.24 Flirting with religion therefore runs the risk of 
introducing new cleavages into the already fractured Kyrgyz society. Secondly, Uzbeks 
and others, such as Uyghurs, are commonly viewed as being particularly susceptible to 
religious extremism. The fact that, in Kyrgyzstan, the membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a 
banned Islamist organization, consists almost entirely of ethnic Uzbeks does little to 
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combat such stereotypes. The very ethnic divisions the state hopes to overcome thus 
undermine the unifying potential of Islam.  
In the final analysis, then, Kyrgyzstan will remain for the foreseeable future a 
nation-state without a nation. Attempts to articulate a generally acceptable civic national 
identity have thus far been desultory and unrealistic. The pivot toward ethnic Kyrgyz 
chauvinism during and after the Bakiyev period has yielded bloody results. Recent 
attempts to find a common ground in religion have some potential to unify, but 
instrumentalizing religion is itself a perilous strategy. Thus far, Atambayev has, out of 
necessity, charted a moderate and conciliatory course. Whether his legacy will be a 
unified Kyrgyzstan that can weather economic hardship and ongoing ethnic tensions 
remains to be seen.  
